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SPECIAL OPERATIONS EXECUTIVE, 1940-1946
SUBVERSION AND SABOTAGE DURING WORLD WAR II
Series Three: SOE Operations in Eastern Europe
Part 1: Czechoslovakia, 1939-1945 and Hungary, 1939-1945
Part 2: Poland, 1939-1945
Part 3: Russia, 1941-1945
Publisher's Note - Part 1
SOEs activities in eastern Europe were limited by distance and the difficulties of finding aircraft which were capable of carrying agents and supplies to the required destinations. This was particularly true in the case of Poland, even after the establishment of bases in the south of Italy after 1943. Czechoslovakia, divided into Slovenia and the German protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, also presented additional difficulties. The virtual incorporation of the Protectorate into Germany, including the security arrangements imposed by the SS, meant that agents faced heavy odds against survival, as the early failures of the Czech section missions showed.
Real impetus came in late 1941, as a result of Benes concern to prove to the Soviet Union that the Czechs were actively resisting the German occupying forces and were sabotaging the arms production which formed a major part of the supplies for the German armies on the eastern front.
After the appointment of Heydrich as Reichsfhrer of Bohemia and Moravia in place of von Neurath in September 1941, the ensuing repression in Bohemia and Moravia caused enormous difficulties for the resistance forces. SOE help was given to two Czech paratroopers in the assassination attempt on Heydrich on 27 May 1942 (Operation ANTHROPOID), which resulted in his death on 4 June. The agents were selected by the Czech government in exile, and trained, supplied and transported by SOE. HS 4/39 includes the SOE reports on the operation, as well as press cuttings and captured German documents regarding the assassination and some later documents which reported on the betrayal of agents in hiding. SOE remained concerned throughout to keep its own role in the operation secret. The reprisals which followed the assassination, however, cowed active resistance in Czechoslovakia for the next two years.
SOE found it very difficult to gain an accurate picture of the internal situation in Czechoslovakia. More operational parties could be sent into Czechoslovakia with the establishment of Allied bases in Italy and missions were also sent into Slovakia to support the rising which broke out in 1944 after the German occupation of the independent Slovakia. The main communications missions in Slovakia were WINDPROOF, MANGANESE and MICA. By late 1944, when the Red Army was approaching Slovak territory, SOEs relationship with the Soviet forces became of central significance. The Chiefs of Staff had made it clear that Poland and Czechoslovakia were to be regarded as part of the Soviet sphere of operations, which caused inevitable disappointment in 1944-45. The head of the Polish section, Harold Perkins, undertook a mission to Czechoslovakia attached to Pattons third army. His reports on the situation in Prague and the activities of the Red Army are in these files.
Although operations in Hungary were never extensive, SOE became involved in the Hungarian political situation, mainly as a means of communication between members of the Hungarian government actively seeking an armistice and the Allies during 1943 and became the chief point of contact with the groups spokesman, Lazlo Veress, a Hungarian diplomat. After the German occupation of Hungary on 19 March 1944 SOEs links with the political negotiations ended, but any attempts at increased operational activity were undermined by the advance of the Red Army and Foreign Office reluctance to challenge Russia in an area which, in spite of October 1944 percentage agreements, was seen as falling within the Soviet sphere of influence.
The records contain information on operations, agents and personnel, administration, intelligence and the political ramifications of SOEs work. There is also much harrowing material on Nazi atrocities and the brutal realities of war in the east.
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