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SPECIAL OPERATIONS EXECUTIVE, 1940-1946
SUBVERSION AND SABOTAGE DURING WORLD WAR II
Series Three: SOE Operations in Eastern Europe

Part 1: Czechoslovakia, 1939-1945 and Hungary, 1939-1945
Part 2: Poland, 1939-1945
Part 3: Russia, 1941-1945

 

Publisher's Note - Part 2

SOEs activities in eastern Europe were limited by distance and the difficulties of finding aircraft which were capable of carrying agents and supplies to the required destinations. This was particularly true in the case of Poland, even after the establishment of bases in the south of Italy after 1943.

SOEs role in relation to Poland was to offer technical aid, training and finance to the Polish resistance, and, as far as its limited transport facilities allowed, the provision of supplies. SOE also received a large amount of information on conditions in Poland through the multitude of resistance bodies which were eventually incorporated into the Home Army. Polish communications remained independent of SOE, and almost all the agents despatched were Polish nationals. Polish resistance groups were spread throughout the world, and SOE was active in liasing with their activities. Polish forces were also active in France and a separate section of SOE called EU/P was formed to deal with them. A special Polish unit (Bardsea) was formed to work with these organisations during the planned Allied invasion of France, although in the event the Bardsea operational areas were to be overrun too quickly to allow the Bardsea personnel to be used. SOE had always been closely concerned with the plans for the Polish uprising, but little practical help could be supplied to the Warsaw uprising, although Selbourne was actively involved in the attempt to persuade Churchill to send more aid. By 1944, as these files emphasize, the organisation also faced opposition from the Foreign Office to expansion of activity in areas which were now perceived as lying within Soviet operational responsibility.

 

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